For the actuary placing reinsurance. Capital, leverage, how past reserves have held up, and warning filings, straight from each reinsurer’s own SEC filings. Ordered by warning signs, then size.
Reserve development = claims for earlier years re-estimated this year, ÷ the reserves held at the start of the year. Red = reserves strengthened (earlier years turned out worse); green = released (better than reserved). A re-estimate under 0.5% is not counted.
| Reinsurer · boat | Capital | Capital growth, 5 yrs, a year | Premiums ÷ capital | Reserves ÷ capital | Reserve development, % of opening reserves | Loss ratio, 2025 accident year | Return on capital, 5-yr avg | Debt ÷ capital | Investments ÷ net reserves | Warning filings, 12 mo | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | ||||||||||
| $24.21B | 13.1% | 0.68× | 1.39× | −2.1% | −4.3% | −2.7% | −2.2% | −2.0% | 58.4% | 19.5% | 10.1% | 1.98× | none | |
| $11.61B | 9.0% | 0.85× | 1.92× | −2.4% | −1.9% | −2.8% | −4.2% | −5.1% | 67.7% | 11.8% | 16.7% | 2.05× | none | |
| $6.36B | 3.7% | 0.96× | 2.85× | −0.2% | −0.2% | +2.7% | −0.1% | −0.5% | 59.1% | 11.8% | — | 1.94× | none | |
| $2.82B | 11.2% | 0.81× | 1.56× | — | −0.9% | −0.5% | −0.7% | −1.8% | 62.7% | — | 5.0% | — | none | |
| $2.47B | 9.6% | 1.12× | 2.34× | −3.3% | −0.4% | −3.3% | −1.9% | −1.3% | 61.4% | 6.3% | 21.8% | 1.72× | none | |
International General Insurance (IGI) IGIC Bermuda (operations in Amman, Jordan) · New ship · no warning signs | $0.71B | 14.7% | 0.64× | 1.12× | — | −7.3% | −6.2% | −5.2% | −4.5% | 55.4% | 20.3% | — | 2.34× | none |
| $15.46B | 9.7% | 1.00× | 2.22× | −0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | +5.3% | +2.2% | 65.6% | 12.9% | 13.2% | 1.48× | none | |
Greenlight Re GLRE Cayman Islands · Sound ship · reserves strengthened in 3 of 5 years (2023, 2024, 2025) | $0.71B | 8.8% | 0.98× | 1.37× | −2.9% | 0.0% | +2.0% | +3.1% | +1.4% | 60.4% | 8.6% | 0.7% | — | none |
AXIS 2025 debt is not reported under a standard SEC item. Hamilton listed in 2023; its 2021 development is not in its filings. Hamilton and Greenlight Re do not report reinsurance recoverables under a standard SEC item, so investments to net reserves is not comparable and is left blank. Oxbridge Re is left out: under $50M of capital. IGI files the foreign annual report (20-F) under US GAAP; its reserve development for 2021 has no opening-reserve figure on file. It reports no long-term debt.
These reinsurers do not file annual reports with the U.S. SEC. Figures are fiscal 2025, as each company published them in its own results release, under IFRS 17 and European or Swiss solvency rules: not directly comparable with the SEC table above (definitions of combined ratio and capital differ), so they carry no boat. Each figure was read from the linked company page; every row is dated.
| Reinsurer | Shareholders’ equity | Net income 2025 | Return on equity | Solvency ratio | Basis | Combined ratio | What the company says about its reserves | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Munich Re Germany · EUR | €33.4B | €6.12B | 18.3% | 298% | Solvency II (target 175–220%) | 73.5% P&C reinsurance, % of net insurance revenue; 80.1% normalised | No reserve statement in the full-year results release. | company release 2026-02-26 |
| Swiss Re Switzerland · USD | $25.1B | $4.8B | 19.6% | 250% | Swiss Solvency Test, at 1 Jan 2026 (target 200–250%) | 79.4% P&C Re | No 2025 reserve statement in the full-year results release. | company release 2026-02-27 |
| Hannover Re Germany · EUR | €12.9B | €2.6B | 21.4% | 256% | Solvency II | 84.0% Property & casualty | “Further expanded the resilience of its loss reserves.” | company release 2026-03 |
| SCOR France · EUR | €4.4B | €851M | 19.2% | 215% | Solvency II (optimal range 185–220%) | 82.3% P&C, net | “The annual P&C year-end reserve review confirms all lines are at best estimate and our reserve resilience has increased.” | company release 2026-03 |
Solvency ratio. The capital a company has, divided by the capital its regulator requires it to hold. Under Europe’s Solvency II, the requirement is the money needed to survive a 1-in-200-year bad year. 100% is the regulator’s minimum; below it, the regulator steps in. 150–220% is a typical healthy target, and above its own target a company holds spare capital. Switzerland uses its own Swiss Solvency Test, measured slightly differently.
Combined ratio. Claims plus expenses, divided by premiums earned. Under 100% means the company makes money on insurance itself, before investment income; over 100% means it pays out more than it takes in.
Reserve development. Each year a reinsurer re-estimates the claims it still owes from earlier years. Strengthening (red) means earlier years turned out worse than reserved; releasing (green) means better. Several red years in a row is the pattern actuaries watch most closely.
Premiums and reserves ÷ capital. How much business, and how much owed to past claimants, sits on each dollar of capital. Higher means less cushion if things go wrong.
Investments ÷ net reserves. Assets on hand against the claims still to pay, after what the reinsurer has itself passed on to its own reinsurers. Above 1× means more invested assets than outstanding claims.
Comparing across tables. Big reinsurers use their own approved models, and the US uses risk-based capital (RBC) ratios while Bermuda uses its BSCR. Figures in different tables are close cousins, not identical measures.
Large US reinsurers owned by groups. They do not file their own SEC annual reports, so each row is taken from what its owner or the company published, on the basis named in the row. Not directly comparable with the SEC table (accounting bases differ), so no boat. Swiss Re America publishes no separate figures, so it is not shown.
| Reinsurer | Owner · basis | Capital | Premiums | Combined ratio | Result, 2025 | Prior-year reserves | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group National Indemnity, General Re, TransRe · USA | Berkshire Hathaway US GAAP, Berkshire 10-K 2025 | Not reported separately (backed by Berkshire Hathaway) | $20,168M written (P&C) | 84.5% P&C reinsurance | $3,170M P&C underwriting earnings ($1,851M for the whole group after retroactive and annuity business) | Prior accident years’ claim estimates reduced $1.1B in 2025 ($1.7B in 2024), mostly lower-than-expected property losses. | source 2026-02 |
| Odyssey Re (Odyssey Group) Stamford, Connecticut · USA | Fairfax Financial IFRS, Fairfax 2025 annual report (undiscounted) | $8,270.4M shareholders’ equity | $5,961.2M written | 93.8% 11 points from catastrophes (83% without them) | $375.2M underwriting profit | Net favourable prior-year development of $196.4M in 2025 ($207.4M in 2024), partly offset by adverse development in casualty reinsurance. | source 2026-03 |
| Munich Re America Princeton, New Jersey · USA | Munich Re US statutory (insurance regulators), year to 31 Dec 2025 | $6,826M policyholders’ surplus | $7,699M written (net) | 100.9% Loss & LAE 69.5% + expenses 35.4% | −$388M net income | No reserve statement on the company’s financial information page. | source 2026 |
SEC-filing reinsurers outside the main table: very small capital, or a reinsurer inside a broader business. Shown so their scale is visible, not hidden. Oxbridge Re’s reserve-development figure does not reconcile with its reserves, so it is left out.
| Reinsurer | Capital, 2025 | Capital, 2024 | Premiums | Net income | Warning filings, 12 mo | Scale flag | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oxbridge Re OXBR Cayman Islands | $5.9M | $3.9M (2024) | $2.3M earned | −$2.1M (2025) · −$2.7M (2024) | none | Capital under $10M: a single catastrophe could exceed it. | SEC 10-K, fiscal 2025 (filed 2026-03-30) |
| Hagerty Re (Hagerty, Inc.) HGTY Delaware, USA | $221.3M (whole company) | $150.3M (2024) | $830.6M assumed (2025) | Prior-year claims $10.1M better than reserved (2025) | none | Reinsurer inside a broader business (insurance agency, marketplace, club); its own capital is not reported separately. | SEC 10-K, fiscal 2025 (filed 2026-02-26) |
Already on this page and based in the Caribbean: Greenlight Re and Oxbridge Re (Cayman Islands). Most other island reinsurers above are in Bermuda (Atlantic). The region’s two big listed carriers, Guardian Holdings (Trinidad & Tobago) and Sagicor, are mainly life and health insurers, not reinsurers. Barbados and the Cayman Islands also host hundreds of captive reinsurers owned by corporations to insure themselves; their financials are private, so they are named here, not shown.
| Risk carrier | What it covers | Coverage | Capital & reinsurance | Claims-paying capacity | Payouts | Built to withstand | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCRIF SPC Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility · Cayman Islands | Parametric catastrophe cover for Caribbean and Central American governments and utilities (hurricane, earthquake, excess rainfall, fisheries) | $1.3B total coverage limit (fifth year above $1B) | $63M retained, backed by $859M of reinsurance | Over $360M claims-paying capacity (earthquake & hurricane portfolio alone) | Over $122M in 14 payouts to 10 members, all within 14 days (Hurricane Beryl: $84.5M to 7 members) | Reinsurance built for a 1-in-700-year Caribbean hurricane/earthquake and 1-in-1,000-year rainfall | annual report Year to 31 May 2025 |
Many US hospital and health systems own a captive insurer in the Cayman Islands to carry their own medical malpractice, healthcare and workers’ compensation risk. Often a licensed US insurer issues the policy and the Cayman captive takes on the risk, acting as the reinsurer. Each captive’s financials are filed privately with the Cayman regulator, so only the totals below are public. The regulator counts healthcare risk in four lines of business:
| Medical malpractice liability | 131 insurers · $3.65B premiums · $15.5B assets |
| Healthcare | 29 · $8.15B premiums · $4.89B assets |
| Hospital and physician liability | 26 · $0.36B premiums · $2.18B assets |
| Accident & health | 11 · $0.32B premiums · $0.47B assets |
| Health-related total | 197 insurers · $12.5B premiums · $23.0B assets |
| All Cayman international insurers | 721 · $61.4B premiums · $189.6B assets |
Source: Cayman Islands Monetary Authority, Q2 2026.
| Health system (examples) | Reported |
|---|---|
| Trinity Health (23 states) | Captive since 1989 |
| ChristianaCare | Captive since 2019; about $128M in assets |
| Bayhealth | Captive since 2023; about $18M in assets |
| Nemours Children’s Health | Cayman captive |
| TidalHealth | Cayman captive |
Source: Spotlight Delaware, 9 September 2026. The named systems are examples reported in the press, not a complete list. Many large US academic medical centres, for-profit hospital chains and children’s hospitals use captives in the Cayman Islands, Bermuda or Vermont. Each insurer is counted under its main line of business; the regulator does not publish definitions of the lines, so a captive that also writes employee life or benefits may be counted elsewhere.
Why health risk can appear as “life”: in insurance regulation, health cover is often grouped with life. In the US, many insurers report health business on the regulators’ “Life, Accident & Health” financial statement, so a health system’s employee medical plan or captive can be licensed and counted as a life insurer even when it pays mostly health claims. Cayman counts each insurer under its main line of business and does not publish what each line includes, so captives that also write employee life, disability or benefits may sit under “Life” rather than “Healthcare”.
See who they are: Search every insurer registered with the Cayman regulator →
Much of the offshore growth is not health captives but US life insurance and annuity business. A US life insurer passes (cedes) blocks of policies to a reinsurer in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, often one sponsored by an asset manager or private-equity group, sometimes as a “sidecar” set up for that purpose. US regulators are reviewing the capital rules for this business.
| Cayman insurers whose main line is life | 43 |
| Their premiums | $21.6B |
| Their assets | $83.8B |
| All Cayman reinsurance companies (every line) | 115 · $39.8B premiums · $113.1B assets |
Source: Cayman Islands Monetary Authority, Q2 2026.
| Offshore reinsurers’ share of annuity reserves ceded by US insurers, 2025 | almost 56% |
| Bermuda | 39.9% (40.9% in 2024) |
| Cayman Islands | 2.3% (2.0% in 2024), driven by several new sidecars set up by US investors |
Source: AM Best, as reported by The Royal Gazette, 20 August 2026. Regulation: US regulators seek tighter rules for offshore life reinsurance (The Royal Gazette, 7 August 2026).
See who they are: Search every insurer registered with the Cayman regulator →
Life reinsurance runs on decades-long policy reserves, so property-casualty measures don’t apply. It gets its own row type.
| Life reinsurer | Capital, 2025 | Capital, 2020 | Liabilities ÷ capital | Invested assets | Debt ÷ capital | Return on capital, 5-yr avg | Net income, 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reinsurance Group of America RGA Missouri, USA | $13.46B | $14.35B | 10.6× | $130.5B | 29.8% | 9.1% | $1.18B |
Reserves over 3x capital; premiums over 1.5x capital; reserves strengthened by more than 0.5% of opening reserves in 2 or more of the last 5 years; capital below its 2020 level; a warning filing in the last 12 months; debt over 35% of capital. The boat = the number of signs, the same harbor the rest of the boards use.
Not on this page: Enstar, Maiden, Aspen, PartnerRe, Validus and Transatlantic no longer file their own reports with the SEC; W. R. Berkley mixes reinsurance with mainly primary insurance; Swiss Re America publishes no separate figures. Bowhead Specialty appears as reinsurance in the data only because it writes through another insurer’s licence. Private Bermuda vehicles, sidecars and catastrophe-bond funds publish no regular financials. Financial-strength ratings (AM Best, S&P), statutory and Bermuda solvency capital (BSCR) and catastrophe exposure are not SEC standard data; they are named here and never guessed. They are named here and never guessed.
Nine boards reading every SEC filing the day it lands, ten editorial desks publishing daily, an open endpoint other AIs can query, and a 70,000-product house behind all of it. This is the public record end of it.